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DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT BY FRUSTRATION
1. THE ROMAN LAW
“I therefore make no apology for going to the Roman  
Law, not as an authority <for such it is not), but as in­
structive as to how these matters may be dealt with and 
as suggestive . . .  as to the true answer to the d iffi­
culties of the present case.”
So said Lord Dunedin in the course of his judgment in 
Sinclair v Brougham The same purpose is in mind here.
So much reference has been made in the decisions (even 
in those of the highest authority) to the principles o f Roman 
Law dealing with impossibility and frustration that it should 
be both interesting and instructive to compare the modes in 
which English and Roman Law would deal with these problems.
Sir James Stephen in his “ History of the Criminal Law of 
England ,2' wrote “ I do not think that the Roman criminal law 
as stated in the authorities— contains anything which can jus­
tify  the loose popular notion that Roman Law is peculiarly com­
plete and scientific.”  This statement is just as true of the Pri­
vate Law and an attempt will be made here to show that a 
strict application of the Roman principles to impossibility or 
frustration of contract would have been no more equitable 
than the results achieved by English Law.
In Roman Law contracts were divided under several heads, 
each characterized by its own “ causa” or reason for enforce­
ment. This essay is concerned chiefly with the stipulatio, the 
consensual contracts (e.g. partnership, sale, work and hire) and 
the quasi-contract— the condictio indebti and its procedural 
associates. The stipulatio (which was obsolete by the time of 
Justinian) was a unilateral contract formed by question and 
answer. An example is given by Blackburn, J in Taylor \* Cald­
well ,3‘ in the following words from the Digest '4' : “ Si sticnus 
certo die dari promissus, aute diem moriatur, non tenetur pro:n- 
issor.”
The consensual contracts were bilateral and were made as 
soon as agreement was reached between the parties. They w e re  
four in number: Emptio venditio (sale), locatio conductio rei 
(h ire), locatio conductio operis (work) and societas (partner­
ship). The “ condictio indebiti” was a quasi ex contractual rem­
edy for money had and received.
The Digest of Justinian recites two main types of impos­
sibility (or “ casus” as it was called), initial and supervening 
impossibility which the authorities subdivided into legal and
«1 >— 83 L . J. Ch. 465 at p. 483 
( 2 1— V o l 1 p 50 (1883i.
( 3 i — 32 L  J. Q  B  at p  166 
« 4 1— D i g e s t  45 1 33
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physical. An example of initial impossibility would be a con­
tract to sell something which, unknown to the parties, had 
ceased to exist. This was treated as a case of impossibility and 
not mistake as in English Law but the result was the same for 
the contract was void "ab initio." This rule was of universal 
application. The cases of supervening impossibility quoted in 
the Digest relate chiefly to the destruction of specific things 
• certa corpora). Initial impossibility nullified the contract but 
>upervrning impossibility avoided it only from the time of the 
impossibility.
The incidence of risk (or periculumj in Roman Law de­
pended on the type of contract which was called into play. The 
example quoted by Blackburn, J. in Taylor v Caldwell 5’ is a 
stipulatio and not a contract of sale (emptio venditio). There 
is no doubt that the promisor was not bound to give the slave 
if the slave died before the date of delivery. I f  the promisor 
could not give, the promisee (or stipulator) was not bound to 
perform and the contract was at an end. On the other hand il' 
the slave had merely deteriorated or enhanced in value the 
promisee must pay the stipulated price and receive the detri­
ment or benefit.
The stipulatio is foreign to English Law and since the 
facts of Taylor v Caldwell do not amount to a sale, the above 
example is of little help in determining the solution that Roman 
Law would have given.
Blackburn, J describes the transaction as one o f license. 
It was not even a hiring. In Roman Law such a contract would 
have been one of hire (or locatio conductio rei). Here the 
maxim “ res perit domino” did apply and the hirer’s liability 
would be extinguished on the destruction of the “ res” and the 
owner would not have been bound to furnish another hall. Thus 
Roman Law avoided the difficulty encountered by English Law 
in applying frustration to leases. Whether the “ res” was land 
or a moveable the lessee (or conductor) had a “ ius in personam’' 
merely. There was no estate.
The contract to do work was the “ locatio conductio operi.s 
faciendi.” One party agreed, as a contractor, to make or do 
something, such as build a bridge or house. He was the one 
on whom the risk fell. Death rarely operated to extinguish this 
contract unless it depended particularly on some special quality 
'>f the contractor.
Appleby v Myers illustrates the difficulties encountered 
when attempting to apply Roman Law. In this case the plain-
V  N  ' 3 '  Su:»Tb pR({«: • » '
iG>— B u c k l a n d  s R o m a n  Pr iv a t f t  L a w  2nd Ed a*, p oOl
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tiff contracted with the defendant to erect and to maintain for 
two years certain machinery upon the premises of the latter 
for a specific sum. When the machinery was only partly erected 
a fire broke out in the defendant’s buildings, without default 
of.either party, and destroyed the building and machinery. The 
court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for 
any portion of the work done since the whole had not been com­
pleted. The solution of this problem would depend partly upon 
whether the employer or the contractor supplied the materials, 
( i )  I f  the contractor supplied them then the transaction was a 
sale o f the materials and a contract of hire for the services of 
construction and maintenance; (ii) i f  the machinery were to 
become affixed to the immoveable, the whole transaction was a 
hire (presumably because of the maxim “ quod inaedificatur solo 
credit” ) without regard to the party who supplied the materi­
als; (iii) i f  the employer supplied, the transaction was likewise 
hire. The liabilities of the parties would be as follows: ( i )  the 
risk o f the material supplied would be on the employer and 
would be limited to the amount used in the construction up to 
the time of the fire. This he must pay for regardless of the 
destruction. As regards the contract of hire, the employer 
would only be bound to pay the contractor either if he had 
approved the work done or ought to have done , so or i f  his 
approval was unnecessary. Otherwise the risk was on the con­
tractor. Alternative (ii) would give the contractor a claim for 
his materials and services if the progress o f the work had been 
approved or should have been approved by the employer or in 
the case where no approval was required by the contract. In 
case (iii) he could recover for his services only as in (ii) above. 
Thus as far as concerned the contractor’s services the result 
might be the same as in English Law but as regards his materi­
als the same result could only happen in case (ii ).
The above were cases of total destruction of the subject 
matter of the contract and are the type o f case contemplated 
by the Digest. What would be the solution of Roman Law to 
the case of Krell v Henry ,8\ The apartment was still available 
on the day required and the owner had not undertaken to put 
on the coronation procession. It is submitted that in such a 
case the risk must be on the hirer for the Digest is firm that 
he must accept delivery and is excused only for “ casus.” In 
spite of the apparent rigidity of Roman Law, the Commentators 
and Neo-Civilians have been ingenious to strain its flexibility 
almost to the breaking point. But the real genius of Roman 
Law lay not so much in its flexibility as in its certainty. The 
parties would know at the time of the contract on whom the 
risk would fall in a particular transaction. It was always open
( 8 i—  (72 L J . K B  794i
to the parties to adjust or apportion the risk by agreement and 
this could be done with greater facility in Roman Law than in 
English Law simplv because one knew where the risk would 
fall.
There is one extension of the principle of impossibility be­
yond the cases mentioned. The doctrine applied with the same 
incidence when the subject matter was seized by the State. 
Death of one o f the parties put an end to the contract only it' 
it w .re personal to the deceased party.
Now a few words about the quasi contractual remedies. 
The "condictio indebiti” lay where-money or anything had been 
given in “ error.”  It was very likely available in cases of initial 
impossibility but it was most certainly not available for super­
vening impossibility in consensual contracts. Nor for that 
matter were “ condictio causa data causa non secuta” and “ con- 
dictio sine causa” which were mentioned by Lord Birkenhead 
in Cantiere Shipbuilding Co v Clyde Shipbuilding Co *9’. In this 
case (which was decided on Scots Law) the respondents agreed 
to construct marine engines for the appellants, to be delivered 
in twelve months. Part of the price was to be paid on signing 
the contract. War broke out before the construction had begun 
after the respondents had done considerable preparatory work. 
It was held by the Privy Council that the first instalment was 
returnable subject to a set-off by the respondents in respect of 
the work they had done. This case is loudly quoted as a testi­
mony to the triumph o f Roman Jurisprudence and is contrasted 
favourably with Chandler v Webster l10' and the Fibrosa Case.
1111 The solution of the Roman Law would have been the same 
as that suggested for Appleby v Myers (12) in the first part of
( i )  above. Thus the results of Scots and Roman Law might 
reasonably differ as regards the right of set-off. But the right 
o f the contractor to claim for the materials used arose not by 
way of a “ condictio”  but out of the contract of sale itself. 
Chandler v Webster would have been decided as in English Law 
because the premises were still available and the suggested 
solution for the Cantiere case (1) would be applicable to the 
Fibrosa case.
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2. ENGLISH LAW
(a ) Historical Development
The modern simple contract in English Law has existed as 
such only from the time of Lord Mansfield in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century and the rules relating to the sanctity of
( 9 )—  93 L J .P .C .  86.
1101— 73 L . J . K B  401.
(ill — ill L . J . K B  433 
1 121 — N < 3• Supra page 2
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contract are the result partly of the old form of covenant and 
the early forms of action. However critically they may be re­
garded the courts have always shown a reluctance to interfere 
with the express terms of the parties; they have held strictly 
that the parties must be regarded as having contemplated the 
whole agreement and that the only function of the court is to 
enforce that agreement i f  need be.
This is the general position and one into which inroads 
must necessarily be made. Terms which were implied by cus­
tom provided they were not inconsistent with the express stipu­
lation of the parties were deemed to be part o f the contract. 
Then the court set itself within limits to determine the mean­
ing of th^ contract. In other words while holding that the words 
or conduct of the parties must always prevail the courts have 
acted on the maxim “ ut res valeat quam pereat” in order to 
give effect to the contract.
This, however, is very different from implying into a con­
tract a term which will dissolve it. Nevertheless in the wider 
application of giving effect to the intention of the parties the 
courts have realized that in certain circumstances the parties 
would have mutually discharged themselves.
Thus it is the general rule of English Law that pure hard­
ship, or greater hardship than was expected, is no ground for 
a party to treat his obligation as at an end. There is no doubt 
that this is the underlying principle of Paradine v Jane ,l3'.
“W hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge 
upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwith­
standing any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might 
have provided against it by his contract.”
This was a case on the action of debt, and the court held 
it was no answer that the lands on lease in respect of which 
the money was due had been overrun by the K ing’s enemies. 
This case has often been quoted as authority for the rule that 
impossibility of performance by a party is no defence to an 
action o f debt or breach of contract brought against him.
There was, however, one important exception to this gen­
eral principle in the Common Law. Even before the time o f 
Paradine v Jane ,13' the executors of a deceased person were not 
liable when the performance in a contract was personal to the 
latter. This principle was cited in Hyde v The Dean and Canons 
of Windsor ,141 and has been repeatedly approved by authority:
(13*— 1647 A le y n  26
(1 4 »— < 1597) 78 E .R . 710, 798.
(1 5 )— 32 L .J .Q B . 164.
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Taylor v Caldwell l15' made the first serious exception io 
the rule of Paradine v Jane. Here the parties contracted that 
a series of concerts should be given on specific dates at the de­
fendants music-hall. A fter the contract was made but before 
the date of performance the music-hall was totally destroyed 
by fire. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and the defend­
ant pleaded discharge by impossibility of performance. Black­
burn, J held that the contract had been terminated by the de­
struction of the music-hall. In the course of his celebrated 
judgment he said:
"The principle seems to us to be that in contracts in which 
performance depends on the continued existence of a given person 
01 thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility arising from  
the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.”
This is a great step forward. The disappearance of the 
subject-matter may, in certain circumstances, excuse the par­
ties from their obligations. Mr. Justice Blackburn was careful 
to point out that no term could be implied where there was a 
“ positive contract to perform.” In that case the parties would 
be held to their bargain, but a contract in terms positive might 
be construed as being determinable on some implied term not 
inconsistent with its express or other implied terms.
Although the parties in Taylor v Caldwell ,16t had not ex­
pressly mentioned that the destruction of the music-hall would 
end the agreement, they had apparently gone into detail as to 
arrangements for the preparation of the music-hall in such a 
way as to show that the existence of the music-hall in the Sur­
rey Gardens in a state fit for a concert was essential for the 
fulfillment of the contract ,l7'.
The next development emerged with the famous “ Corona­
tion Cases”  in 1903. Whatever their differences none o f them 
were impossible or incapable of performance. The subject mat­
ter was still in existence and therefore there could be no impos­
sibility in the sense of Taylor v Caldwell. In the latter, Black­
burn, J. spoke of the “ continued existence of the foundation of 
the contract.”  One is required to seek the foundation of the 
contract, be it some project, material object or person. In Krell 
v Henry ll8‘ the defendant was to have “ the entire use of cer­
tain rooms during the days of the 26th and 27th of June.” The 
coronation processions were to pass these premises on the dates 
named and although it had not been expressly mentioned that 
the rooms were required for that purpose the court took the 
view that, having regard to all the circumstances, the parties 
had contemplated the processions as the foundation of their 
contract.
115*— See 13 I Supra .
(1 6 )— See <31 .
(1 7 )— a t  p. 166 o f  th e  R e p o r t .
(18 ) 7p L .J .K  B . 794.
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Herne Bay Co v Hutton ,19' illustrates the limits of the 
rule in the previous case. The defendant agreed to charter the 
steamship of the plaintiff Company for the 28th and 29th of 
June “ for the purpose of the Naval Review, a day’s cruise around 
the fleet and for other similar purposes.” Because o f the King’s 
illness the review, like the coronation, was cancelled. Romer, 
L.J., said of this case:—
“I need scarcely point out that it cannot be said that by reason 
of the failure of the Review there was a total failure of consider­
ation not anything like a total destruction of the subject matter 
of the contract.” ,20>
The expression “ total failure of consideration” is intro­
duced. The choice of these words is an unhappy one because 
frustration may operate where there has been only a partial 
failure of consideration, as in Krell v Henry (21’. However there 
was not that loss o f the “ foundation” of the contract which 
was held to occur in the latter case.
Such is the difficulty when the frustration of an adventure 
and not the total destruction of the subject matter is involved. 
What must happen when there is a partial destruction or a 
temporary but undetermined incapacity? Lord Sumner in Bank 
line Ltd v Capel 1221 approved the following rule. He said that:
“The main thing to be considered is the probable length of the 
total deprivation or use of the chartered ship compared with the 
unexpired duration of the chartered party— the probabilities as to 
the length of the deprivation and not the certainty arrived at after 
the event, are also material.”
Reference to a charter party does not restrict this rule. It has 
been repeatedly affirmed in other types o f cases. The test in 
determining frustration is the probable length of total depriva­
tion and secondly the court must view the matter as the parties 
would have done when the event happened. A  third element is 
required in such cases.
Three years earlier Tamplin S.S. Co v Anglo-Mexican Petro­
leum Co ,23‘ was decided in the House of Lords. The defendants 
took a time charter for five years starting in 1912. In 1914 the 
Government requisitioned the ship and the House o f Lords 
found, not unanimously, that the interruption was not such as 
would excuse the parties from further performance. Any inter­
ruption is bound to cause some damage to the parties. In the 
course of Lord Loreburn’s speech (1) he posed the following 
question:
(191— 72 L .J .K B  879.
(20)— at p. 882.
(211— 72 L .J .K B  794
(221— 88 L.J .K  B. 211 at p. 218.
(231—85 L.J .K  B. 1389.
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“W ere the altered circumstances sucn that, had they thought 
of them, they would have taken their chance of them, or such that 
as sensible men they would have said, ‘I f  that happens, of course 
it is all over between us’? W hat, in fact, was the true meaning 
of the contract?
This is the third element. One must ascertain from the terms 
of the contract that both parties would have decided not to 
enter into their contract if the subsequent events (and which 
they did not contemplate at the time) had been brought to 
their notice. The foregoing must be read together with the 
two quoted above from Lord Sumner. In the Bank Line Case 
,24‘ the charter was only for twelve months and was made in 
February, 1915 after the start of the war. We may well ask 
whether, here, the parties had not contemplated an interrup­
tion, such as the requisition by the Government and had in con­
sequence taken the risk and stipulated for a short charter. 
However, the House of Lords held that the contract had been 
frustrated. It is not easy to reconcile these two cases. Cheshire 
,25' explains the apparent anomoly by arguing that there was 
really no adventure in the Tamplin Case to be frustrated. But 
on the other hand if the parties in the Bank Line Case had had 
an interruption in contemplation, then the doctrine o f frustra­
tion should not have been applied.
(b ) Leases
The most interesting problem and the most speculative one 
is whether the doctrine of frustration applies to a lease. The 
recent case of Cricklewood Pty v Leighton Trust 1261 shows the 
division of legal opinion on this subject. In this case A  had 
taken a lease of lots of land for 99 years and had undertaken 
to build shops thereon. A fter the declaration o f War in 1939 
the Government imposed severe restrictions on building which 
amounted to a prohibition. Nor were materials and labour 
available for the building o f shops which was the undertaking 
in this case. The only question to be decided was whether, on 
the facts, frustration could be deemed to have occurred (assum­
ing that the doctrine did apply to a lease). The House of Lords 
unanimously held that there was no frustration but it was 
evenly divided on the preliminary “ obiter” question of applying 
the doctrine of frustration to a lease, Lord Porter declined to 
commit himself.
English Law has always distinguished contract and con­
veyance. It is a corollary of the traditional reluctance of the 
courts to disturb completed transactions. But on the other hand 
it seems unjust that a hard and fast line should be drawn and 
that the vesting of a determinable estate in land should bar
(2 4 )— 85 L .J .K .B . 1389 a t  p. 1394.
(2 5 )— C h esh ire  an d  F ifo o t ,  L a w  o f  C on tra c ts .
(26 ) —  (19451 1 A l l  E .R . 252.
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the relief open to the parties of a mere contract. Viscount 
Simon, L.C. in the Cricklewood Case ,27‘ considered the whole 
problem as “ res integra.” He felt that he was not bound by 
authority and distinguished Matthey v Curling ,28' as a case 
where, on the construction of the document, the relevant coven­
ants still bound the lessee. Mr. Justice Blackburn in Taylor v 
Caldwell (29' stated that it was immaterial that the particular 
transaction was not a “ letting.”  In Krell v Henry '30' Their 
Lordships spoke of a “ letting” of the premises, although, as in 
Taylor v Caldwell, the transaction would not operate as a lease 
because of the limited hours of user.
Paradine v Jane 131' was a claim for a debt (a matter 
which was emphasized by Lord Simon, L.C. in the Cricklewood 
Case l32') and the judgment does not mention tenure and may 
be taken to state the general rule to which the operation of 
frustration is the exception. Lord Atkinson in Matthey v Curl­
ing 1331 approves the statement of Law in Paradine v Jane and 
Lord Buckmaster in the same case cites Paradine v Jane as an 
authority that even unlawful entry by a third party will not 
relieve the lessee of liability under the covenant.
The difficulty is typified by the Cricklewood Case ,34'. The 
mere fact that a particular object cannot be performed for a 
limited time cannot be considered to frustrate any adventure. 
But as Atkin, L.J. observed in Matthey v Curling l35’.
“ . . . it does not appear to me conclusive against the appli­
cation to a lease of the doctrine of frustration that the lease in 
addition to containing contractual terms grants a term of years. 
Seeir.g that the instrument, as a rule, expressly provides for the 
lease being determined at the option of the lessor on the happen­
ing of certain specified events. I see no absurdity in implying a 
term that it shall be determined absolutely on the happening of 
other events— namely, those which in an ordinary contract wo.k  
a frustration.”
In Bailey v De Crespigny (36' Hannen, J. says:
“But where an event is of such a character that it cannot rea­
sonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the 
contracting parties when the contract was made, they will not be 
held bound by general words which, though large enough to in ­
clude, weie not used with reference to the possibility of the p a r­
ticular event which afterwards happens.”
(27 ) — (1945) 1 A l l  E R .  252 a t p. 255.
(2 8 )—  91 L .J .K .B . 593.
(291— 32 L .J .Q B . 164 a t  p. 165.
(3 0 )— 72 L .J .K .B . 794.
(3 1 )— 1647 A le y n  26.
(3 2 )— See (1 ) S u p ra .
(331— 91 L .J .K .B . 593 a t  p. 616 an d  p. 613
(3 4 l— (1945) 1 A l l  E .R . 252.
(3 5 )— 91 L .J .K .B . 593 a t  p. 603
«36 • —38 L .J  Q  B. 98 a t  p. 102
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In this case land had been compulsorily acquired by a Railway 
Company which built on the land so acquired thus contravening 
an express covenant in a lease in favour of the lessee. In an 
action on the covenant by the lessee against the lessor it was 
held that the doctrine of frustration applied to relieve the latter.
In view of the fact that leases usually make provision for 
insurance and have covenants to repair, it seems difficult to 
imagine a  case where frustration could apply. It is common­
place in frustration that the express terms of the parties must 
govern and that a positive promise must be fulfilled no matter 
how onerous. Therefore the cases where the doctrine of frus­
tration might apply in modern leases must be rare indeed.
Were frustration to be allowed to operate, gross injustice 
might occur, as for example, improvements would cede to the 
landlord and any premium which had been paid would be for­
feited to the lessor since the rights of the parties accruing 
before frustration would not be disturbed.
In the Cricklewood Case, Lord Russell of Killowen said a 
lease as a venture could never be frustrated. He was o f opinion 
that the difficulty or impossibility o f performing some coven­
ant could not divest the estate. But surely when the parties 
can say that the estate shall cease on the occurrence of a cer­
tain event it cannot be illogical for the court to imply a term 
which will determine the estate. I f  a case did arise where the 
adventure collapsed “ owing to the occurrence of an intervening 
event or change of circumstances so fundamental as to be re­
garded by the law both as striking at the root of the agreement 
and as entirely beyond what was contemplated by the parties 
when they entered into the agreement” then surely there is a 
case for frustration. The mere rarity of the possible applica­
tion of the doctrine is confused with the belief that it cannot 
apply. It is contended that there is ample scope in a proper 
case where the doctrine may apply and the essence is not so 
much the distinction between the impossibility o f performing a 
covenant and the divesting of the estate; it is the application 
of a rule such as that stated by Atkin, L.J. in Matthey v Curl­
ing ,37’ quoted above.
Lord Buckmaster in Matthey v Curling (38’ observed 
“ There is no question here of performance having become im­
possible— although enjoyment of the premises has been inter­
fered with by legal powers.”  It is true enough that neither the 
covenant to pay rent nor the covenant to repair had become 
impossible, but it is just as certain that the foundation of the 
transaction, namely quiet enjoyment and occupation had been
(3 7 )—  See N  (9 ) page  9.
(3 8 )— 91 L .J .K .B . 593 a t  p. 614.
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completely disturbed. Parties do not enter into a lease merely 
to acquire a legal estate but in order that they may enjoy it. 
A  man enters into a contract not merely to acquire legal rights 
but to acquire the undertaking of the transaction. I f  he cannot 
have that undertaking fulfilled in an ordinary contract, frus­
tration may operate (although independently o f the will o f the 
parties). How then is it logical to deny a similar discharge 
where the parties have transferred a determinable legal estate 
and where the object for which such transfer was made has 
become “ defunctus” ? Nor is it altogether an answer that the 
Government will indemnify for the interruption. Frustration 
has been awarded in cases of charter-parties notwithstanding 
that compensation might be payable by the requisitioning au­
thority. Examples could be multiplied. “ The Doctrine o f Frus­
tration” observes Lord W right in the Cricklewood Case ,39' “ is 
modern and flexible and is not subject to being constricted to 
an arbitrary formula” .
(c ) Burden of Proof of Default
It is axiomatic that a party cannot benefit from his own 
wrongful act or default. So then default will bar the seeking 
relief on the ground of frustration. Lord Simon, L.C. in Con­
stantine Line v Imp. Smelting Corpn ,40' approves the above rule 
and sets out to decide on whom lies the burden of proving such 
default. I f  default will negative the plea of frustration, is it 
necessary that the party setting up frustration should show 
that he had not been guilty of default or neglect? The House 
of Lords in the above case answered unanimously in the nega­
tive. The obvious hardships o f any other rule are pointed out 
in the speeches of Their Lordships. The rule is that once frus­
tration has been established a case is made out for the prima 
facie discharge of the contract. The party alleging the default 
must prove it.
But what default will deprive frustration of its effect? 
What happens in cases of personal performance? Lord Simon 
141 quotes the case of a prima donna who has caught a cold 
because she was careless in not changing her wet clothes after 
being in the rain. His Lordship enquires whether her plea o f 
frustration of an executory contract to sing would fail on this 
ground. It is not intended to answer this question but it is 
worth while to point out that the self-induced frustration is 
not coextensive with “ default,” and to note that default may 
include negligence as well as wilful default. The precise limits 
o f these terms is yet to be judicially defined.
(391 — (1945) 1 A l l  E .R . 252 a t  p. 263.
»401 —  119411 2 A l l  E .R . 165.
(41 ) —  (19411 2 A l l  E .R . 165 a t  p. 173
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(d ) The Effects of Frustration
The rule in Chandler v Webster ,42' that, in cases o f frus­
tration “ the loss lies where it falls" has been a blot on English 
jurisprudence since it was laid down in 1904. But even in spite 
o f the Fibrosa Case t43) the rule may be valid even today. Their 
Lordships, in the latter case, held that if  the rule was intended 
to refer to a payment made out and out then the rule was cor­
rect. WJiere the consideration was divisible and payment had 
been made or been appropriated in satisfaction of some executed 
part of the agreement then that money must be irrecoverable. 
The rule in the Fibrosa Case 1 4 4 under which money paid is 
recoverable, will apply only when the consideration is entire 
and there has been a total failure of consideration.
Lord Simon argued that this was an action “ quasi ex con­
tractu” for the recovery of money paid for a consideration that 
has totally failed. The law implies a promise to repay notwith­
standing the firm rule that frustration does not disturb the 
rights o f the parties acquired before frustration, it  would ap­
pear that one party would have a right to sue for money due 
while the other would have an action “ ex contractu”  to recover 
it back. This seems to be the result of this case. Their Lord­
ships take refuge in the venerable maxim “ Nemo debit locu- 
pletari aliena jactura,” and Lord MacMillan attempts to resolve 
the problem by stating: l45) “ on the other hand the law may en­
deavour to effect an equitable adjustment between the parties” . 
It  can hardly be said that the Fibrosa solution was an equitable 
adjustment between the parties. The respondents who had been 
put to considerable expense were not permitted to retain a 
“ quantum meruit”  for the fruitless work they had done. Later 
on, His Lordship explains ,46) the harshness of the rule and says 
that English Law takes the course “ that the law implies for 
the parties what it assumes they would have agreed upon—  
when they entered the contract.” One must accept this decision 
as an example o f the court in its role of the reasonable man, 
adopting a course which it is inconceivable that any reasonable 
business man would adopt.
The maxim “ the loss lies where it falls” cannot apply where 
money is paid for a consideration that has failed. It applies, 
however, in other respects.
(4 2 )— 73 L .J .K .B . 401.
(4 3 )— 111 J .J .K .B . 433.
(4 4 )— See (2 ) above .
(4 5 )— 111 L .J .K .B . 433 a t  p. 446.
(4 6 )— See (4 ) S u p ra .
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The Fibrosa Case must be taken to have laid down the law 
applicable in the Common Law Provinces of Canada. England 
now has the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 to 
remedy the defect. It is possible under this Act to achieve the 
results that were achieved for the Law of Scotland twenty 
years ago by the Cantiere Case (47)
A  term was implied by custom in voyage charters making 
freight paid in advance irrecoverable. The Act has made no 
provision against this.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties o f English Law have been twofold: to de­
termine (a ) when the events could be said to constitute frus­
tration and (b ) how the risk involved should be distributed.
In case (b ) the course of the Roman Law has much to 
recommend it. The parties knew exactly where the risk would 
fall in any particular transaction and it was, therefore, easy 
for them to apportion it by agreement. It  was no hardship to 
the buyer to be responsible for the risk after the contract be­
cause he could contract against it. The Sale o f Goods Act 1893 
makes a simple provision for the incidence of risk in agreements 
to sell specific goods. The English formula (which still remains 
and more particularly in Canada) that the “ loss lies where it 
falls”  is unscientific in that one can never foretell just where 
it will fall. In Chandler v Webster ,48' for instance the loss 
might easily have been the other way. How far the incidence 
of this rule has been removed by the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 remains to be seen. One must hope that 
its salutary provisions will not be too strictly construed. A t any 
rate it represents a break from English Tradition and recog­
nizes the principles of Roman Jurisprudence insofar as they 
have been altered and accepted by Scots Law in the Cantiere 
Case l49’.
In case (a ) the problem is to find a definition of the prin­
ciple which will apply to cases of destruction o f the subject 
matter and frustration of the adventure alike. But before a 
general rule can be stated it is necessary first to dispose of 
certain cases which will not come within the frustration rule 
whatever it may be. Where the parties contemplate the exist­
ence of something which, at the time of making the contract 
is non-existent, the purported contract is void “ ab initio”  for 
mistake. There is no contract and no question of frustration 
arises. But where the event occurs after the contract is made,
(4 7 )— 93 L .J . P .C . 86.
(4 8 )— 73 L .J .K .B . 401.
(4 9 1 — See ( l i  above.
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frustration does not “ ipso facto” arise. A  consideration of the 
above cases shows that the event must be of a definite charac­
ter and the contract is good until this is successfully proved. 
The general rule relating to contracts appears still to be gov­
erned by Paradine v Jane ,50>.
The event which has brought about impossibility may be 
the result of the act of one of the parties and i f  this is so, the 
courts will not allow him nor, apparently, the other party to 
take advantage of frustration as a ground of discharge. This 
is called self-induced frustration and was defined and approved 
by Lord Sumner in Bank Line Ltd v Capel ,5U. Here His Lord­
ship remarked, “ I think it is now well settled that the principle 
of frustration of an adventure assumes that the frustration 
arises without blame or fault on either side <52).
In Maritime National Fish Co v Ocean Trawlers 1531 a ves­
sel had been chartered but remained subject to the granting 
o f licenses by the Dominion Government. Some licenses were 
issued but not sufficient to cover all the respondent’s vessels 
and the latter appropriated the licenses to their other ones, 
thus leaving the one chartered to the appellants without any. 
The former pleaded frustration but it was held by the Privy 
Council that, since they had caused the frustrating act, they 
could not set it up to discharge the contract. The parties may 
contemplate the happening of the event which caused frustra­
tion. The weight of authority excludes this type of agreement 
from the doctrine. However there are two cases in which this 
does not appear to have been the case. In the Tatem v Gamboa 
l54' a boat was chartered during the Spanish Civil War to work 
on behalf of the Republican Government, a matter which would 
naturally involve the risk of confiscation by the Nationalist 
forces. This event did occur but the court held that the con­
tract had been frustrated. Goddard J. found as a matter o f 
construction that such an event was not in the contemplation 
o f the parties at the time of the contract. The same decision 
was reached in the Bank Line Case ,55' and the same objection 
may be taken.
Total failure of consideration has been mentioned (Herne 
Bay S.S. Co) (56\ But there are too many cases where this had 
not been so. Total failure of consideration is not enough. Tay­
lor v Caldwell and Krell v Henry suggest that one condition 
must be performance within the terms of the contract. This 
may or may not involve total failure of consideration.
(5 0 )— 1647 A le y n  26.
(5 1 )— 88 L .J .K .B  211 a t  p. 217.
(5 2 »— S ee (2 ) Supra .
(5 3 )— 104 L.J. P .C . 88.
(5 4 )— (1938) 3 A l l  E .R . 135.
(5 5 i— See (2 ) Supra .
56— 72 L .J .K .B . 879.
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I f  a person enters into an absolute positive contract it is 
no defence to say that it has become burdensome or even impos­
sible. He is bound to perform. However terms, in themselves 
positive, may be so framed that they can be held to assume the 
continuance of some person, material-object or state of affairs, 
and it is a question of construction in each case where such an 
implication can validly be made. Lord Wright in the Constan­
tine Case ,57' in referring to an opinion of Lord Sumner said:
“It is true that a contract absolute in terms may be absolute 
also in effect. The contractor if he cannot perform, must pay 
damages . . . .  However a contract absolute in terms is not 
necessarily absolute in effect.”
The Learned Law Lord was referring to Lord Sumner’s dictum 
in H irji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co ,58' “ it is really a 
device by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled 
with a special exception which justice demands.” Lord Sumner 
was referring indirectly to a question of construction, and dis­
tinguishing the doctrine of frustration from rescission which 
operates at the will of the party aggrieved. One must look at 
the contract at the time the parties entered into it to determine 
whether the existence or continuance of any special circum­
stances was to be vital to the contract.
When the event brings about temporary deprivation the 
test must be that laid down by Lord Sumner in the Bank Line 
Case 1591 as follows:
“The main thing to be considered is the probable length of 
the total deprivation of the use of the charatered ship compared 
with the unexpired duration of the charter party.’’
The doctrine of frustration will operate as a condition, im­
plied by law into the contract provided, such condition was:
(i) not contemplated by the parties at the making 
of the contract and they made no provision for i t ;
( ii) the event was of such a nature that had the par­
ties thought of it they would never have entered 
the contract;
(iii) the event destroys the foundation of the contract 
as both parties understood it when they entered 
into it;
( iv)  the event was not brought about by the default 
of either party.
(5 7 )— (1941) 2 A l l  E .R  165 a t p 185.
(5 8 )— 95 L . J P C .  121 a t  p . 129. 
(5 9 i— 88 L .J .K .B . 211.
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All of this is to some extent a far cry from the original 
rules of Roman Law which have been extended and distorted 
to give English Law its modern doctrine of frustration. A l­
though Roman Law did not arrive at a generalization o f the 
principles as they are known today yet a study o f that heritage 
has brought great and fruitful results to both English and other 
systems o f Jurisprudence.
THE THIRTIETH MEETING OF THE CANADIAN  
BAR ASSOCIATION
Although the Thirtieth meeting of the Canadian Bar Asso­
ciation began on Monday, August 30, with registration taking 
place all day, the meetings were confined to the Executive Com­
mittee o f the Canadian Bar Association, the Conference of the 
Governing Bodies of the Legal Profession in Canada and the 
Council of the Canadian Bar Association. Not until Tuesday, 
August 31, was the official opening held, with the President o f 
the Association, John T. Hacker, K.C., M.P., presiding. A t this 
opening session Prime Minister Maurice Duplessis o f Quebec 
spoke. His speech was both interesting and novel especially in 
the manner in which he presented Quebec’s case for judgment 
in connection with the much-talked about and famous Quebec 
Padlock Law.
The Presidential Address was given by John T. Hackett 
and the annual reports of the various committees were then 
given. At noon there was a luncheon given by the Bar o f Mont­
real in the Normandie Room at the Mount Royal Hotel. The
Hon. A. T. Vanderbuilt, Chief Justice of the State of New Jer­
sey, gave a most interesting address.
The afternoon was taken up by meetings of various sec­
tions o f the Bar Association; a somewhat unique situation oc­
curred in that all sections met at the same time, a fact which 
was to receive some criticism by the close of the conference.
Dinner was given by the Government of the Province of 
Quebec in the Windsor at which Maitre Maurice Ribet, Bâton­
nier de l’Ordre des Advocats a la Cour de Paris, was the speaker.
Wednesday started with sectional meetings till noon when 
a luncheon was given by the General Council of the Bar of Que­
bec. The address was given by the Hon. John A. Costello, Prime 
Minister of Eire. His address centered around the independ­
ence of Eire which he termed Ireland and he stressed the lead
